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In lhe Supreme Court of the State of Utah
BANK OF AMERICAN FORK, a Utah
('orporaiion,
Plaintiff and Apvellant,
v.
G L CORPORA'I'ION, a Utah corporation, KAY L . .JACOBS, CALVIN
R. ANDERSON,
ALVIN G. SCHOW, BANK OF
PLEASANT GROVE, a lJtah corporation, srrATE BANK OF LEHI, a Utah
corporation, JOHN DOE I, JOHN DOE
II, JOHN DOE III, .JOHN DOE IV,
JOHN
V and JOHN DOE VI,
Def cndruits and Res7Jn11dents.

Case No.

12223

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF

8T A '1' l<JMEN'T' 0 F

CASE

Plaintiff bank':-; complaint :;:pdrn a declaratory judgment that Defendant hanks are conducting an unlawful
hranrh ln1nk in American Fork through Defendant bank
ol•nice eoqioration: an injunction restraining Defendant
hanks frorn hran('h hanking in American Fork and an
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injunction restraining Defendant bank service corpora.
tion from paying, sorting or posting checks in An1<'rican
Fork for Defendant banks.

DISPOSITION IN

COUR'P

Plaintiff's complaint was dismissed by the Iowl'r
court for failure to state a claim upon which relief could
he granted.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff sPeks a reversal of the judgment of dismissal and judgment as prayed in its complaint. Defendants seek to have the judgment of dismissal affirmed.

S'l'ATEMENT OF FACTS
For the purpose of DP fondants' motion to <lismis$
only, Defendants admit the farts pled in Plaintiff's complaint and accept the stah•1110nt of the same as sC't forth
in the statement of facts in Plaintiff's brief except that
Defendants deny Plaintiff's statement that the activitit''
of Defendant G L Corporation have wrongfully invadeLl
the property rights of Plaintiff and DPfendants
rausing Plaintiff wrongful injury.

d1'111
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At the argument upon DPfondants' motion to dismiss, it was explained that the service actually being
performed by G L Corporation was to magnetically
(mcode checks (with the amount payahle so as to make
them readable by computer) ; to sort them and to post
thrm to hank customer accounts by means of electronic
rqnipment and that G L Corporation was not equipped
or designed

to deal

or fnrnish check cashing or

other services to the public or even to customers of the
banks using G L Corporation's computer accounting
service.
ARGUMEN'r
POINT I.
PLAINTIFF'S

COMPLAINT

FAILS

TO

STATE

A

CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED.

7-3-G, U.C.A.
m:

as a11wnded provides

follows:
"Busin<:ss condud(•d nt hanking house Branehing of offices-\Tiolation of section a misdenH'anor.-The lmsi1wss of every hank shall be
comlncted only at its hanking house and every
hank shall rN'<'ive de]JOsits and pay checks only
at its banking house except as hereinafter provided.
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"vVith the consent of the bank commissioner
any bank having a paid-in capital and surplus
of not less than $GO,OOO may establish and
one branch for the transaction of its business;
provided, that for each additional branch established there shall be paid in an additional $60,000
(capital and snrplus).
"All banking houses and branches shall hr
located either within the corporate limits of a city
or town, or within unincorporated areas of a
county in which a city of the first class is located.
"Except in cities of the first clas::i, or within
nnincorporated areas of a county in which a city
of the first class is located, no hranch slmll lw
established in any city or town in which is locater!
a bank or hanks, state or national, regularly transacting a
banking business, unless the
bank seeking to establish such branch shall take
over an existing bank. No unit bank organized
and operating at a point where there are other
operating banks, state or national, shall be permitted to be acquired by another bank for the
purpose of establishing a branch until such bank
shall have been in operation as such for a period
of five years.
"'rhe term 'branch' as used in this act shall
be held to include any branch hank, Lranch office.
branch agPncy, additional offic<', or any hranclt
place of hnsines:,; at which deposits are l'('ceiw<l
or checks paid or money lent.

5
"Any hank desirillg to establish one or more
hranchl'S or offices shall file a written application
therefor in such form and containing such information as the bank commissioner may reasonably
require. No bank shall be permitted to establish
any branch or office until it shall first have been
shown to the satisfaction of the bank commissioner that the public convenience and advantage
be subserved and promoted by the establishment of such branch or office. The bank commissioner may, at his discretion, hold a public
hearing on any such application to establish a
branch. He shall give notice of such hearing by
publication in three successive issues in a newspaper of general circulation in the county in which
the branch is to be established. 'l'he decision of
the bank commissioner granting or denying an
application to establish a branch shall be in writing, state the reasons therefor, and shall be mailed
to the applicant and all protestants. The bank
eommissioner may by order permitting the establishment of such branch or office designate and
limit the character of \\·ork and senicP which may
therein lw performed.
"No branch shall lw established at a location
outside the corporate limits of a city or town in
snch close proximity to an Pstablished hank or
branch as to nnreasonahly inkrfere with the business thereof.
"Any coq)oration or officer thereof violating
any of the provisions of this section is guilty of
a rnisdernPanor."

(j

'1'hi8 statnte
contt>mplatPs a t;ystPm wh(•rehY
the placP or placl's at \Yhich a hank comlltcts its hankinna
business with tlw puhlic will lw controll(•d liy tlw state
through the bank connnissioner. Tlw mat(']'ial n·forPnC(:>
in the statute are to ''the hnsincss of every hank" a11cl
''its banking housP." "Braneh'' is not ddi1wd except to
statP what snch term shall inelnde. Th(• statnk when
read as a \Yho!P makes
clear that in dPfining
''branch" the legislative intent of 191 l \Yas to include
offices and places
the essential bnsiness of providing banking se1TiePs to fop puhlic is provid0d. 'l'hn,
the statute lH"OYidcs that a "hran<'h" inclndes "am
hranch hank, branch offi<'P, branch
additional
office or any branch 11lace of \rnr,;iness at which deposits
are recei,·ed or chN·ks iiai<l or mom•y lent."
Plaintiff's complaint does not all0gc that Defendant
hanks or any of the other Def en clan ts ar<• doing a banking husiness with the imhlie at places otlwr than at
Defendant banks' long ('Stahlished hanking pr0rnisl'S. Jt
does not allege Dl'l'enclants liavc establislwd an unauthorized hranch hai1k at Auwrican Fork. 1t docs not PWll
dir<'ctly all0gP that Defrndants hav<' done acts urged !11
constitute a hanking lrnsirn•:-;s; i.P., rPC'PiYed tlPposits, 11aid
C'hecks or lent money at an nnauthorizt>d offiee or plnl'"
of hnsin0ss in A1rn-•rican l<'ork.
In short, it assPrts nothing constitutillg a Yiolatinn
of Section 7-:1-G, 1T.C.A. (195:3), and wa:-; pror)('rly ck
mi ssPd.
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POINT II.
THE PROCESSING OF CHECKS IN THE COURSE OF
CHECK ACCOUNTING SERVICES SUPPLIED TO BANKS
BY A BANK SERVICE CORPORATION DOES NOT CONSTITUTE BRANCH BANKING BY SUCH BANKS AT THE
PLACE SUCH ACCOUNTING SERVICES ARE PERFORl\IED.

Plaintiff has as:fflllPd in ih; hrief that it properly
alleged Dcf Pnda11t hanks are paying checks in American
Fork through tht- functioning of G L Corporation. Construing the allegations of Plaintiff's C'omplaint as favorably to Plaintiff as conceivably may lw done and assuming it does so allege, it still falls short of showing any
lia,;is for rPlief.
Th<> basic activity of (} L Coqioration of which
Paintiff
comrilains is :wt forth in paragraphs
:2 and !l of Plaintiff's complaint. These read as follows:
"') D<>frndant, 0 L Corporation, is a Utah
Corporation with its principal plaee of business in
Auwriean Fork, Utah. It i,; organized and opPrat<>d as a hank senie<' corporation pnr,rnant to
the provisions of 7-:l-:E5,
1D5:i, as amendt>rl, and 1wrfonns ('Prtain services for the Bank
of PlPasant OrnvP and tlw 8tatP Bank of Lehi,
includi11g eh<>('k :;orting and posting to individual
aeco1mts of' tl1e draw<'l', maker or other pPrsons
tn h" diarg1•d.
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"9. Plaintiff alleges that by paying
for Defendants, Bank of Pleasant Grove and
Bank of Lehi, which said banks are not located in
the corporate limits of the City of American Fork,
Defendant, G L Corporation, is, in fact, a branch
bank of said Defendant Banks, acting as such
without authority of law and in specific violation
of Section 7-3-G, U.C.A., 1953."
The substance of Plaintiff's contr•ntion is simply that
G L Corporation's compnt<>r processing of checks drawn
on Defendant banks in the course of which checks are
sorted and posted to hank customer accounts constitutes
payment of the same and that such payment
the American Fork computer center of G L Corporation
a branch of each and eYery Utah bank using it.
This proposition is untenable.
The section of 1Jtah's Uniform Commercial Code
cited by Plaintiff, Section 70A-4-213, U.C.A. (1953), is
directed to the question of when the payor bank becomes
finally and irrevocably liable for an item to the presenting bank or person. It appears to take into account the
commercial banking practice of posting checks to customers accounts in setting forth such posting as one of
four alternative points beyond which the payor bank is
responsible for an item vresentecl for payment.
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Defendants submit this statute has nothing whatever
to do ·Kith determining "'hat practices may constitute
branch banking.
The only possible issue raised hy Plaintiff's complaint is whether a bank may arnil itself of independent
off-premises computerized bank accounting services with
respt•ct to the dwck items it receives without running
afoul of the branch banking rPstrictions contained in
(195:3).
Section 7-3-G,
The obvious answer is .'·es.
In 19G3, sornP G2
after original Section 7-3-6
1rns adopted in Utah, the Utah L('gislatnre enacted Section 7-:3-32.5, U.C.A. ( 1953), which pro,·ides as follows:
'' 'Bank service corporation' and 'banking
s<>rvices' defined-Solt> stockholding bank authori11ed-Yisitation and t•xaminaton of hank service
corporaton.-(1) The tPrm 'bank
corporation' means a corporation organized to perform
bank services for two or more banks, each of which
mrns part of the capital stork of such corporation. Tlw term 'bank servicPs' means services such
as check and deposit sorting· and posting, computation and posting of intt>rest sorting and posting,
e01n1mtation and posting of intNest and other
en·d1ts and charges, p1·eparntion and mailing of
chPcks, statements, noticPs, and similar items, or
any otlwr <'IPrical, hookkr•eping, accounting, statistical, or :-;imilnr J'nnctions iwrforn1ed for a hank.
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"(2) If stock in a bank service corporation has
been held by two or more banks, and one or more
of such banks ceases to utilize tlw services of the
corporation and cease.s to hold stock in it, and
leaves the other as the sole stockholding bank,
the corporation may nevertheless continue to func.
tion as such and the other bank may continue to
hold stock in it.
" ( 3) Every bank service corpora ti on shall hr
subject to visitation and examination as provided
in section 7-1-7, Utah Code Annotated 1953."

This statute permits Utah banks to utilize new hanking equipment and procedures developed over the last
few years to keep up with the increasing flood of checks
being written. This is done through the use of corporations organized to perform bank accounting services.
These services include computerized check and deposit
sorting, posting and any other clerical, bookkeeping, accounting, statistical or similar functions. Since the 1940's
and 1950's posting has become mechanized. The eleccomputers now used can handle 100,000 items per hour.
ROHNER, Posting of Checks, Final Payment and The
Four Le_qals, The Business Lawyer, .July, 1968, p. 1075,
1080.
Nothing in the bank s0rv1ce corporation statute re
quires a bank service corporation snch as Def Pndant G L
Corporation to perform hank sen-ices sneh as posting
checks in a hank's own banking honse

01·

to olitain tl1r•
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l'Onsent of the hank commissioner before rendering bank
services, including the posting of checks, in its own facilities. Any such requirement would he unnecessary, shortsighted and perhaps even unconstitutional since the effect
would he to give the large banks an unfair competitive
('dge since tlwy can afford thPir own in-house computers,
small banks genPrally rannot. SPe PENNEY,
Bank 8tateme11ts, Cancelled Checks, and Article Four in
the Elrctronic Age, 85 'The' Banking Law Journal 659,
1i(i2-GG3 fn. 8 (Ang. UHiS).
DPfendants submit that the branch hanking statute
was not designed or intmded to operate in the hypertechnical, unreasonable fashion ar1-,rued by Plaintiff
whereh)· a computPrizcd off-premis('S accounting procedure instituted 50 YE'ars after tliP branch hanking statnte was adopted constitutes hn:mch hanking per se even
though done pursuant to a n<'\\' statute expressly authorizing tlw same. Instead the hranch banking statute was
<lPsignPd and does by its exprPss terms place l1ranches,

offices and 11laces of

bus1.11css

through which hanks do

Im ;:.11ess u'ith tlie 7nil1lic und('J" thP control of the state.
Plaintiff

only tltP ''rhecks paid" languagt'

of Sertion 7-3-G and fails to recognize that it is not
paymPnt of ('liPcks \Yith ·which the statute is concerned
lmt dPalinµ; with thP publi(' at and through unauthorized
lueation;-;.
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At the time St>ction 7-:3-G was adopted, getting a
check paid often involved a trip to the hank, personal
presentation of the item and its paynwnt in cash by a
teller. Today check paymPnt almost never involves direct
contact with the presenting person. lnstPad it involves
credits and charges at electronic speed.
Viewed in the light of the legislatin intent, Section

7-3-6 and Section 7-3-32.5 are entirely harmonious. If
they are deemed confliding, Plaintiff still has no canse
for complaint because

lat0r enactment controls.

Thiokol Chemical Corporation v. Peterson, 15 Utah 2d

355, 393 P.2d :391 (1964) and Parific Intcrmonntain Express Co. v. State Tax Comm'n., 7 Utah 2d 15, 316 P.2d

549 (1957). Not one of the cases cited hy Plaintiff deals
"rith off-premises bank check sorting and posting; hence•
none support Plaintiff's position or are in any "-ay particularly in point. The fair irnplicaton to he drawn from
them as a whole supports Defendant's position.
First Nat. Baok of Lo9a11. v. Walker Bank & Trust
Co., 19 Utah 2d 18, 4-2fi P.2d 4-14 (10G7), held a hank's

new drivE'-in, walk-up facilities whereby the public

w::i:.;

St'rved not an unauthorized hranch hank lweanse the sanll·
·were essentialh- on the hank's premises and eonstitnted
a feature of a modernization of an ('Xisting hanking facility.

,,
1;)
Plaintiff hPre sePks to deprin' ])pfrndant banks of
the use of the modern computer facilities of a hank service corporation. Yet in the Walker Bank case this Court
specifically held that "the legislatiw 1mrpose in prohibiting the establishment of brancllPs by hanks not in conformity with the statute is not defeated by rnodPrnization
programs."

In West Side Ba11k v. Marine Nat. Exchange Bank,
155 N.VV.2d 587 (Wis. 1968), a collecting bank sought a
determination that a drawee bank had proceeded past
the point of no return in processing a cllPck and could
not return it pursuant to thP maker's stop order. No
issue regarding branch hanking was ]Jl'esented.
Jackson v. First Nat. Bank of Cornelia, 292 F. Supp.

15G (N.D. Ga. 1968), held that tlw practice of operating
an armored car bank messengn service whereby funds
were transmitted between a bank and its customers,
change was made and a teJlpr's service was provided
contravened a Georgia statute requiring the business of
banking to be limited to the bank's Pstablished place of
lmsiness.
The "Utah "\Valker Bank case" (Plaintiff's brief, p.
5), First Nat. Ba11k v. Walker Bank & Trust Compawy,

385 U.S. 252, 17 L. ed. 2d 343 (1966), held that Utah's
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limitations on branch banking were absorbed by 12 U.S.C.
36( c) and ·were thereby made applicable to national
banks operating in Utah in order to achieve competitive
equality between the two.

In Dickinson v. First Nat. Bank in Plant City, Florida, 400 F.2d 548 (5th Cir. 19GS), the utilization of shopping center receptacles for night bags of money and
checks and the furnishing of an armored car messenger
service to transport customer funds to and from a bank
were declared violative of a Florida law that a bank
have only one place of business.

Jackson v. First Nat. Bank of Valdosta, 349 F.2d 71
(5th Cir. 1965), held only that the Georgia Superintendent of Banks was a proper party plaintiff to maintain
a suit for a declaration that a national banking association could not la-wfully operate a drive-in banking facility.
The last case cited by Plaintiff, Continental Bank
and Trust Company v. Taylor, 14 Utah 2d 370, 384 P.2d
79G (1963), involved a practice of making automobile
loans to the public through various insurance agents at
their various homes, offices and places of business instead of at the premises of the bank. This Court then
held such improper because snch misc<>llaneous offices

I
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through which hank loans were made to the public were
not established and conducted through the procedure
by Section 7-3-G U.C.A. (1953).
DefPndant banks do not deal with or offer banking
services to the public at any place besides their established hanking
and Plaintiff's complaint does
not charge that they do. Plaintiff bank only complains
that Defendant banks use the bank services of a bank
service corporation. However, such services, including
the computerized check and deposit sorting and posting
denounced by Plaintiff, have been expressly authorized
by the Legislature. The Legislature apparently saw no
hranch banking implications in its authorization of bank
accounting services by bank service corporations. If
it did, it felt no concern as its broad grant contains no
(1ualifications or restrictions on the physical location of
a hank service corporation's premises and place of business. 'rhe fact G L Corporation performs accounting
work for Defendant hanks does not constitute the place
of lmsi1wss of G L Corporation anyone's branch bank.
Plaintiff cites no ease in which the effrct of offprernises bank aeronnting SPrvice was even presented
as an issue, let alone as the basis for a branch banking
arg-nm<c•nt. Defendant has found no case besides this
01w

\rhc•n, such an argument \Yas made. The branch bank

('ases are eollech•d in an annotation in 23 A.L.R. 3rd 683.
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CONCLUSION
Plaintiff's contentions and Plaintiff's complaint are
as unmeritorious as they are unique. The trial comi
properly dismissed Plaintiff's complaint and its judg.
ment should be affirmed.
Respectfully snbmitted,
Arthur H. Nielsen
NIELSEN, CONDER,
HANSEN AND HENRIOD
410 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 •
Attorneys for Defendants
and Respondents

